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Abstract 
 
This summary report presents the main results of an extensive review of operating 
experience related to deficiencies of the reactor cooling chain. The cooling systems 
included in the review are the Essential Service Water System (ESWS); the Component 
Cooling Water System (CCWS) and the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS). More 
than 1000 events from the International Reporting System (IRS) database, the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) licensee event report database and the 
French and German national databases were analysed.  
Root cause analyses carried out allowed identifying Human and Organizational Factors 
(HOF) to represent a significant share in the spectrum of root causes. This finding is 
reflected in the long list of lessons learned from the events. 
Recommendations how to avoid or mitigate similar events in future are included in the 
report. The lessons learned are presented separately in the Annex to this Summary 
Report. All recommendations made focus on enhancing nuclear safety whenever it might 
be affected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The centralized office of the European Clearinghouse operated by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) of the European Commission performs regularly in-depth studies on 
operating experience feedback of safety relevant equipment in NPPs. The topics to be 
covered by studies are identified by the European Clearinghouse Member States during 
their yearly Steering Committee meeting. 
This Summary Report presents the major results of a comprehensive study [ 1] 
performed by the centralised office of the European Clearinghouse on operating 
experience from events related to the reactor cooling chain of nuclear power plants.  
The report was prepared in cooperation with Institut de Sûreté Nucléaire et de 
Radioprotection (IRSN) and Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS). 
This in-depth analysis of unusual events at nuclear power plants related to deficiencies 
of the reactor cooling chain was performed to extract lessons learned and provide 
recommendations to the international community to further improve nuclear safety and 
operational reliability. The systems considered and analysed are: Essential Service Water 
System (ESWS), Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) and Residual Heat Removal 
System (RHRS). 
Failures of supporting systems which affect a large number of connected components 
and systems and which are not specific to the reactor cooling chain have not been 
included in the study. In addition, the study does not address the impairment of ESWS 
due to external hazards (blockage of heat sink, icing, external flooding…) as this was 
already covered by another topical study on external events [ 2]. 
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2. Methodology  
 
Operating experience from events related to the reactor cooling chain was gathered from 
four databases. IRSN and GRS analysed information from their respective databases, i.e. 
France and Germany while JRC processed information from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s International Reporting System (IAEA IRS) and United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Licensee Event Reports (US NRC LER). At the latest stage, JRC 
combined and further processed available results in the present study. 
The databases were searched using specific searching tools (keywords and/or 
guidewords combined with logical operators) suitable for each database, yielding the first 
list of potentially relevant events. The reports contained into this first list were reviewed 
individually to determine their pertinence for the study, thus obtaining a screened list of 
relevant events. 
The events relevant to the topic were classified into categories depending on:  
• Plant status; 
• Impact on safety; 
• Affected system; 
• Affected components; 
• Direct cause of the event; 
• Causal factor and root causes and 
• Occasion and detection of the event. 
For further analyses, the categories were divided into families and, if necessary, into 
sub-families. To achieve this goal, two consecutive steps were defined:  
• Screening of databases and identification of events relevant for the reactor 
cooling chain; 
• In depth analysis of the causes, root causes, contributing factors, consequences 
and lessons learned, and classification of them into families, in order to identify 
recommendations helping to avoid recurrence of similar events. 
The present summary report focuses on the recommendations which can be drawn from 
the operating experience through analysing events affecting the RHRS, CCWS and ESWS 
cooling systems. System-oriented and situation-oriented lessons learned are presented 
separately within the annex of this summary report. It should further be noted that the 
full report of the study [ 1] presents all of them in detail. 
  
  
 
7
3. Main Findings  
 
This chapter describes the main statistical results of the study. No attempt to combine 
the statistics from the different databases was made as their reporting criteria are not 
consistent. 
IAEA IRS search resulted in initially 206 events. Manual screening was followed by 
reading and analysing each event. For this study 142 events were selected. 
Regarding US NRC LERs database, the search yielded 262 LERs. Following the screening 
stage, 208 LERs were found applicable for this study. 
Screening the French national database revealed 381 events being relevant for this 
study. It has to be noted that a few events (24) of them were reported to IRS too.  
The German database revealed 442 events relevant for the purpose of this report. Here, 
five events were double counted as they were reported to the IAEA IRS database too. 
 
3.1. Affected System 
Fig. 1 through Fig. 4 provide the statistical distribution of events for the three cooling 
systems. For RHRS the screening method used allowed to further split up the events to 
events concerning the main role of RHRS (i.e. heat removal, RHR) and the events 
concerning the secondary functions of RHRS (i.e. emergency core cooling and fuel 
building pools cooling, ECC/FPCS). 
 
  
Fig. 1: Affected system in IRS reports Fig. 2: Affected system in US NPPs 
  
Fig. 3: Affected system in French NPPs Fig. 4: Affected system in German NPPs 
 
A high rate of events was recorded during either power operation or cold shutdown 
because these two states are the most common and many tests or maintenance 
operations can be carried out only during cold shutdown. It was observed that the 
number of events is quite similar for "On power" and "Cold shutdown" as operating 
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technical specifications allow carrying out periodic tests or maintenance while the reactor 
is on power.  
The events reporting a problem with RHRS were around 50% from the IRS and by about 
60% from the US NRC database; while the number of the component cooling system and 
ESWS affecting events are significantly lower. 
Regarding the French database, 43% of the reported events affect the component 
cooling system while 40% are related to the residual heat removal system. The residual 
heat removal function can be carried out by both, the residual heat removal (RHR) and 
the fuel pool cooling system, in case of total loss of the RHR. As the fuel pool cooling is 
only used as a backup for the residual heat removal when the reactor coolant system is 
totally depressurized, the number of events affecting this system is low (5%).  The 
ESWS is responsible for 17% of the events. Note that one third of the events affecting 
the RHR are generic events. 
As for the German distribution, 50 % of events affected the RHRS. Although the 
distribution of events between systems seems to be similar, events have a different 
impact on safety. 
 
3.2. Casual Factors and Root Causes 
The analysis of the causal factors and root causes for events from the four databases is 
presented in Fig. 5 to Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Root causes in IRS reports Fig. 6: Root causes in US NRC reports 
 
Fig. 7: Root causes in French events Fig. 8: Root causes in German events 
 
The main causal factor or root cause is "Human and Organisational Factor" (HOF). The 
different distribution in the German database is not a surprise as in the German 
reporting system small leaks, non-trough wall cracks etc. have to be reported too 
(regarding mechanical failures). As for electrical failures these were classified according 
to equipment since a high percentage of the causal factors and root causes could not be 
identified during the investigations carried out. A probable reason for that is the fact that 
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the investigation of the root causes of electrical failures is more complex and sometimes 
the components were destroyed during the event. 
Fig. 9 to Fig. 12 present the detailed root causes of the family “Human and 
Organizational Factors”. Errors during tests or maintenance activities followed by 
misalignment of systems or components and procedural deficiencies are the dominating 
causes consistently identified from all four databases. 
 
  
Fig. 9: HOF root causes in IRS reports Fig. 10: HOF root causes in US NRC LERs  
 
Fig. 11: HOF root causes in French events Fig. 12: HOF root causes in German events 
 
The second largest contributor to root causes was found to be "Equipment" (see Fig. 5 
to Fig. 8). Fig. 13 to Fig. 16 illustrate the statistical analysis performed for the detailed 
root causes related to equipment.  
 
 
Fig. 13: Equipment-related root causes in 
IRS reports 
Fig. 14: Equipment-related root causes in 
US NRC LERs 
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Fig. 15: Equipment-related root causes in 
France 
Fig. 16: Equipment-related root causes in 
Germany 
 
Among events of the sub-families of "Causes related to equipment", events due to fault 
before/during installation and after installation and those caused by ageing are quite 
equally distributed. Events in the sub-family “Others” are quite numerous and include 
detection of foreign objects, faulty internal coating, deficiencies caused by environmental 
conditions, oscillations, etc. 
The statistics in the figures above show different structures in the distribution of events. 
This is due to the different reporting criteria applied in USA, France and Germany; while 
no well-defined reporting criteria exist for IRS and causes are more evenly distributed.  
In the French SAPIDE database the non-compliance criterion with the technical 
specifications corresponds to about 50 % of the reported events. The technical 
specifications effectively authorize a specified time of unavailability for safety equipment. 
If the unavailability time of system/component of the reactor cooling chain exceeds the 
authorized time, the reactor shall be passed at shutdown. In other cases, notably if the 
unavailability time is less than the time allowed by the TS, failures are declared in 
another database called SAPHIRE managed by the licensee and accessible to the French 
safety organisations. 
In Germany every failure or unavailability has to be reported. For example, if a pump 
does not start, it is immediately declared as unavailable, even if the damage can be 
repaired within the time frame specified in the technical specification (in most cases: 
unavailability of one out of four redundancies allowed for 14 days). Thus, in Germany 
the requirement to report and the unavailability period are not coupled.  
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4. Recommendations 
 
In this section event related, specific recommendations are listed and discussed. The 
recommendations shall help to learn from events to avoid their recurrence and to 
improve the safety of NPPs. 
 
4.1. RHRS Vibration and thermal fatigue 
The positioning and condition of the supports have a strong effect on pipe vibration 
phenomenon. For systems particularly sensitive to vibration, special surveillance should 
be carried out. It is important to remove nozzles that are unnecessary and 
sensitive to vibrations in safety-related systems and to perform a vibration analysis 
whenever modifying the design of the system (including determination of vibration 
natural frequency). 
As the residual heat removal system includes by nature fluids of different temperatures, 
special attention should be paid to design and surveillance of mixing areas as well 
to operation modes of RHRS to avoid excessive thermal fatigue which could lead to crack 
initiation and propagation. Some examples of preventive measures are: 
• Limitation of time during which the RHRS operates when the temperature in the 
primary system is higher than 90°C;  
• Surveillance tests of mixing areas using ultrasonic techniques after 450 
hours of operation where the temperature in the primary system is higher than 
90°C, or five years at the most, after the sections involved have been replaced. 
 
4.2. Configuration errors (addresses both RHRS and CCWS) 
The study has highlighted a number of occurrences where the RHRS cooling function was 
lost or RCS unexpectedly drained due to configuration error caused by: 
• Improper communication between the Main Control Room and the local operators 
or between plant departments; 
• Insufficient administrative controls; 
• Improper tasks sequencing; 
• Insufficient control of work. 
This shows the need for: 
• Reinforcement of the work control process (as regards: work permit release 
and the importance to plan works, which should not be performed 
simultaneously, in separate stages of the outage planning; the control of 
adequate timing of physical tagging of equipment; the need to keep operational 
control in the MCR of ongoing work). 
• Specific analysis of which plant interventions and tests may be allowed during 
mid-loop operation and more generally all operational phases with reduced RCS 
water inventory, including the transitional RCS drainage phases. 
In addition to these faults, other configuration activities led or could have led to the RCS 
draining not because the activities were not properly carried out but because these 
activities resulted in drain down paths which were not previously identified. This shows 
that design vulnerabilities of RHRS and connected systems with potential RCS drain 
down should be thoroughly analysed so as to eliminate configurations with potential for 
drain down paths. Accordingly, creation or modification of configuration procedures for 
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RHRS and connected systems (for tests, maintenance or other purposes) should consider 
the potential for drain down paths. 
There are also numerous possibilities for interconnecting both CCWS trains. This 
normally triggers an alarm in the control room as such an interconnection could lead to 
the loss of both trains. However, experience has shown that existing configuration 
procedures and alarm may not be enough to prevent human errors. It is therefore 
recommended to reduce the risk of human failure by providing interlocks on isolation 
valves on redundant trains. 
 
4.3. Mid-Loop operations 
Related to mid-loop operation, three barriers of defence should be maintained: 
1. Prevention of RHRS vortex formation by installing instrumentation to make the 
primary coolant level measurement more reliable (for instance additional 
Ultrasound Testing sensors) and arrangement of RHRS operating parameters 
limits in order to increase the margin relative to the risk of pump losses. 
2. Enhance monitoring by implementing RHRS pumps vortex detection based on 
monitoring the operating parameters of these pumps (flow rate, pressure and 
motor current). 
3. Automatic makeup of borated water into the primary cooling system in case of 
loss of RHRS pumps due to vortex formation. 
If feasible, a requalification test for the Instrumentation and Control of the automatic 
makeup function should be scheduled right before the RCS is taken to mid-loop 
operation. An overall availability check of the automatic makeup function should be 
carried out with the reactor fully unloaded and RCS water at minimum level, whereby 
RHR pumps are stopped.  
These hardware precautions should include the consideration of human and 
organisational factors: 
• Direct indication of the critical parameters such as water level as well as 
automatic alarms should be available to the control room command. 
• Detailed procedures should be available for the RCS drain-down process, which 
should clearly describe the respective responsibilities. Procedures should require 
recording of the actual water level during drain down to maintain awareness of 
level. It should also be made clear how the potential calculations are used to 
evaluate the water level from different sensors, including uncertainty and round-
off. These procedures should be based on information relevant for a specific unit 
and on specific operating conditions for the definition of limiting parameters (such 
as minimum RCS water level or maximum RHRS flow rate).  
• Specific emergency procedures for the recovery of the cooling function in case the 
RHRS fails should be established. 
• Although problems related to operation of the RHRS at mid-loop are well known, 
it seems necessary to permanently refresh the attention of the operators to the 
precautions to be taken. Operators should be trained for operating phases where 
the risk of losing the residual heat removal function is high and for procedures 
mentioned above. A full-scope simulator would allow training in mid-loop 
operation. 
• The rarely performed drain-down operation is a type of operation where operator 
performance can be enhanced by focusing on briefings and review of commands, 
control, and communication at the beginning of the operation and after shift 
changes. 
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4.4. RHRS operating in safety injection mode 
Another characteristic of RHRS is the potential for reaching vortex conditions at the 
RHRS pumps suctions because RHRS may be connected to systems with unfavourable 
pressure and temperature values (apart from mid-loop operation).  
It should be ensured in the analysis of design basis accident that the operation of RHRS 
as Low Pressure Safety Injection is not compromised by limiting conditions of water 
bodies (pressure / temperature / level) from which the water is pumped up and which 
could lead to vortex conditions in the RHRS suction pipes. If needed, corrective 
measures should be taken such as design or procedure modifications. 
Other reported potentials for RHRS failure when being used as ECCS are pressure 
differences between RHRS and ECCS. These could cause the connection valve thrust to 
be insufficient and thus prevent valves from operating. Temperature differences between 
the two systems mentioned could result in steam voiding when the systems are 
connected. 
It should be also ensured in the analysis of design basis accident that the limiting 
difference of conditions (pressure and temperature) between RHRS and ECCS do not 
impair the safety injection when these are lined-up. If needed, corrective measures 
should be taken such as design or procedure modifications.  
 
4.5. Unavailability of RHRS due to lubrication issues  
Adequate measures related to lubrication practices should be taken to avoid a common 
mode failure that would not be limited to the residual heat removal pumps. For example: 
• Ensure traceability of lubrication operations. 
• Limit the number of types of grease intended for lubrication of safety-related 
rotating machines, with a reasonable objective of two types of grease per plant. 
• Use of different types of grease, depending on whether the components to be 
lubricated are located inside or outside the reactor building. 
• Choose types of grease that are reputedly mutually miscible. 
• Use the same type of grease and the same lubrication frequency for both motor 
and pump. 
• As concerns the RHRS pumps which operate intermittently and are located inside 
the reactor building (problems associated with frequency of lubrication and 
premature ageing of grease caused by ionizing radiation), it is requested to 
make-up the grease at the beginning of refuelling outages so as to expel all old 
grease. Such make-up is recommended at the beginning and end of each ten-
yearly outage. 
• Ensure clear labelling of lubricators. 
 
4.6. Inadequate calibration of RHRS flow rate meters  
Considering the wide range of RHRS operation conditions (mainly temperature 
conditions), appropriate adjustments should be made to the RHRS flow measurement to 
ensure measurements are correct and requirements of minimal flow rate for the RHR as 
the Ultimate Heat Sink are fulfilled.  
 
4.7. Cooling to RCP thermal barriers 
Considering that CCWS is a barrier between the radioactive fluid and the environment, 
appropriate attention should be paid to the design and maintenance of the CCWS 
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isolation valves. CCWS may convey fluids with high levels of impurity on both sides of 
CCWS heat exchangers and a leak at these heat exchangers could lead to a direct path 
of radioactivity out of the Reactor Building. In particular, a leak of RCP thermal barriers 
with non-operable isolation valves could lead to a non-isolable LOCA.  
All analysis (for example the plant fire safe shutdown analysis) should recognize the 
need to protect the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger for hot safe shutdown and 
should evaluate the ramifications of not protecting the heat exchanger. The applicable 
design basis documentation should incorporate the actions to isolate the RCP seal water 
return line in the applicable (fire, for this example) area, while respecting the compliance 
strategies and the manual action timeline analyses. 
 
4.8. Operation of CCWS in accident conditions 
During accidental conditions CCWS as a closed cooling water system is subject to 
significant transient temperature variations because of the limited system heat capacity 
and the potential for substantial changes in heat addition and heat rejection rates. The 
complex nature of some of the sub-systems may make it difficult to correctly identify the 
most limiting potential operating configuration of CCWS. Certain safety-related 
components served by CCW systems, such as air conditioning units and emergency 
diesel generators may fail in a non-recoverable manner as a result of temperature 
transients outside the system design basis. Because temperature transients initiated by 
an accident may affect redundant parts of the closed cooling water system, safety-
related components in redundant trains necessary for mitigation of an accident may be 
affected. 
In addition, the configuration of the CCW system may change in the course of the 
accident as some sections are first isolated, and then de-isolated, which could lead to 
pressure and temperature transients and which should be considered as well to identify 
the CCWS limiting conditions. 
It is therefore recommended that CCWS limiting operation conditions (Pressure / 
Temperature) should be carefully identified during and after accidental phase and that 
those limiting conditions should be included in the design of CCWS and CCWS-cooled 
components and/or for the establishment of Emergency Operating Procedures. 
 
4.9. Pressure locking and thermal binding (concerning both 
CCWS and RHRS) 
The potential for failure of systems to perform their safety functions as a result of 
thermally-induced over-pressurization is dependent on many factors. These factors 
include leak-tightness of valve seats, bonnets, packing glands and flange gaskets; piping 
and component material properties, location and geometry; ambient and post-accident 
temperature response; pipe fracture mechanisms; fan coast-down characteristics and 
the effect of fan operation on water in the associated fan cooling system; relief valves 
and their settings and system isolation logic and set-point. Engineering design and 
modification evaluations which include systematic assessment of heat input to systems 
and components with consideration of factors mentioned above should detect conditions 
influencing system operability under normal operations, operational transients and 
accident conditions. Following identification of those conditions, corrective actions should 
be taken including design modifications (drilling an internal hole, adding a vent line…) 
and operation procedures (emptying pipes …). In some cases after proper assessment 
an internal valve leak rate rather than complete water tightness may be accepted by the 
Technical Specifications. 
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Moreover, thermal over- pressurization should not be understood as an independent 
active or passive failure in the sense of the "single failure" concept. This means that 
active or passive failures due to over-pressurization should be considered in the same 
system and other systems in evaluating plant response to a postulated accident. For 
instance, if relief valves are installed to prevent overpressure conditions, consideration 
should be given to the effects of a stuck-open relief valve and consequent diversion of 
system flow, associated environmental flooding and radiation hazards. 
 
4.10. Temporary device rendering one CCWS train 
unavailable  
Temporary devices (used during periodic tests for example) should be managed 
effectively. These devices represent a certain type of equipment modification which 
should remain in place only exceptionally after having conducted a risk analyses showing 
the absence of impact on any safety feature. In any case they should be managed 
according to existing rules. 
  
4.11. Failure of the 10kV circuit breaker of a CCWS pump  
For safety reasons the expansion shafts of the circuit breakers should be changed after a 
number of switching cycles considerably less than recommended by the 
vendor/manufacturer. Circuit-breakers with a comparable construction should be 
checked if there is a risk of micro-cracks caused by the manufacturing process. 
 
4.12. External corrosion of ESWS components 
Experience has shown that ESWS components may be subject to cracks which are not 
due to inner corrosion or erosion but also to external corrosion induced by environmental 
factors or to structural fault (inadequate supporting…). The layout and structure of ESW 
systems is generally plant specific but it may include piping sections that are buried and 
not readily accessible for inspection. Buried sections of piping can be subject to periodic 
wetting from storms or local flooding conditions. Exterior protective coatings may not be 
fully intact due to improper installation, age degradation, or maintenance practices. It is 
also possible for some ESW piping sections to be located in vaults or pipe chases that 
are subject to periodic flooding and/or high humidity. Other components like hatch neck 
and hatch neck flanges are subject to corrosion too. 
This shows that: 
• Exterior surface of ESWS piping and other ESWS components should be protected 
against humidity-induced corrosion (coating, prevention of rainwater 
intrusion…). 
• ESWS piping and other ESWS components should be subject to periodic 
inspections aiming at: 
o Detecting initiators for corrosion or cracking (for instance water infiltration 
through gallery walls or roofs, presence of water on the floor, inadequate 
supporting...),  
o Verifying the quality of corrosion protection (coating…) and  
o Detecting corrosion before leaks occur. 
• Piping and components conditions should be recorded and trended appropriately. 
Visual inspection of the outer surface of those piping and components is not always 
possible and it may be needed to remove interfering material such as mortar. 
Consequently it should be defined in the inspection programme how and under which 
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conditions this material should be removed (systematically or depending on findings 
made in the surrounding). 
Inspection may be of different nature (visual, NDT, etc…) depending on the access to the 
components. More detailed information about the different types of inspections can be 
found in [ 9]. 
 
4.13. Prevention of Micro-biologically Induced Corrosion 
The ESWS is responsible for cooling the CCWS, also in emergencies. The ESWS heat sink 
is a water reservoir such as a river, lake or sea which involves by nature that ESWS 
components can be exposed to harsh environment. Apart from clogging of ESWS filters 
by debris (see [ 3]), experience has shown that this harsh environment causes damage 
of components by corrosion due to saline environment, rainwater or micro-organisms. 
This is not a new phenomenon; corrosion of ESWS components has been already been 
described in e.g. [ 4], [ 5] and [ 6]. 
MIC on carbon steel increases general through-wall pitting and fosters the formation of 
tubercles. Tubercles consist of corrosion products, microbes, and debris. Tubercle growth 
could restrict cooling water flow to equipment. 
It should be noted that stainless steel piping is not immune to MIC because microbes can 
attack at the weld heat affected zone in stainless steels when this zone becomes 
sensitized. MIC can also damage metals lined with polymeric materials, typically at 
coating imperfections. 
Treatment against established colonies of tubercles involves a combination of mechanical 
or chemical pipe cleaning, continued water treatment and regular maintenance. 
Continuous flow conditions have been found to prevent the attachment and growth of 
microbial films. 
In case of biocide injection, it should be ensured that the injection point allows biocide to 
reach all parts of the ESW system potentially subject to MIC, in particular dead-end lines 
and small diameter pipes where injection may be problematic. 
It may be necessary to replace materials if MIC severely damages them or where 
mitigation measures cannot bring the system conditions under control. Possible 
alternatives include replacing carbon steel with stainless steel or replacing stainless steel 
with more resistant materials, such as 6-percent molybdenum stainless steels, nickel 
base alloys, titanium, or non-metallic materials. 
In any case, the material selection should be done in close collaboration with the 
manufacturer. Especially the material of safety related components for low flow areas 
should be tested in conditions representative of the fluid carried by ESWS.  
 
4.14. ESWS liner peeling off 
Experience with numerous cases of ESWS piping inner coating peeling off exists. Coating 
material is entrained in the system and can cause clogging and/or results in the piping 
inner surface to be unprotected against corrosion. This shows that bonding of the coating 
material should be ensured with adequate procedures and good adhesive properties, 
especially if the coating is applied in-situ over an existing layer of coating. Proper 
measures (procedures, tools, training…) should also be taken to limit the damage to 
inner coating when inner surfaces are cleaned up from foreign material; coating 
conditions should be verified after such activity. 
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An inspection programme should be established for the inner surface of ESWS piping and 
components in order to verify the condition of the inner coating (proper adhesion, 
absence of air bubbles) and to detect the presence of corrosion or erosion. 
The ESWS piping and components should be inspected exhaustively with an inspection 
frequency which should be adapted to the potential for corrosion (for instance locations 
with low or no flow or influenced by cavitation). In case visual inspection is not possible 
(such as for small diameters) other techniques should be envisaged (fiberscope, CDD 
camera, inspection robot…). 
 
4.15. Leakage of ESWS heat exchangers 
Although leaking ESWS/CCWS heat exchangers are not an immediate threat to safety 
because they still provide sufficient cooling, it should not be forgotten that these 
exchangers constitute a containment barrier and that leaks in this barrier undermine the 
defence in depth (experience has shown that a direct path of radioactive fluid from RCS 
to the environment via simultaneous leaks of two lines of barriers cannot be excluded). 
For this reason, in order to avoid that the situation of a leaking exchanger lasts and 
deteriorates over an extended period of time, maintenance programmes should be 
defined for these exchangers: preventive and predictive maintenance but also corrective 
maintenance triggered by pre-defined leak rate thresholds. The maintenance 
programmes should consider the design of exchangers in relation to the corrosive 
environment as well as the potential impact of mechanical (or high pressure) cleaning of 
the exchangers. The programmes may also include chemical treatment and replacement 
of parts. 
 
4.16. ESWS pump not starting during periodic test 
The function of indicator lamps of different operation modes (automatic/manual) of 
safety relevant components has to be checked to ensure that the component is always at 
the right mode. 
 
4.17. Loss of seismic qualification of several valves caused by 
inadequate maintenance  
Maintenance teams should regularly be informed about standard practices (proper screw 
identification, tightening torque, choice of tools, etc.) that affect seismic qualification in 
the long term. Very precise maintenance procedures that include all information required 
to ensure seismic qualification of equipment and to compensate for any lack of worker 
knowledge with standard practices should be established. 
 
4.18. Valves setup when connecting ESWS with non-safety 
related system 
In case ESWS is connected to a non-safety related Service Water System, proper 
measures (maintenance and tests) should be taken to ensure that isolation valves 
between the two systems would fulfil their isolation function in case ESWS is in 
operation. A failure could challenge the sustainability of the alternate ultimate heat sink. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This report has studied more than 1000 unusual events related to the reactor cooling 
chain with information obtained from both, international sources and national databases 
(USA, France, and Germany). 
Although the different reporting systems of the four databases used in this report did not 
allow identifying a common pattern for the root cause analysis of events, it became 
evident that Human and Organisational Factors have a significant share of the root 
causes. One representative example is configuration errors. All three technological 
systems studied (ESWS, RHRS and CCWS) are prone to such weaknesses because of the 
existing possibilities for interconnection between trains or even units (for ESWS), the 
existing connections with other systems (mainly for RHRS where configuration errors can 
lead to so called "Inter Systems LOCA") and the complexity and relatively low frequency 
of some activities like draining down the RCS to operate at mid-loop. 
There is consensus that mid-loop operation, especially at the beginning of an outage, is 
an activity inducing a significant risk. Progressive improvements of measures aiming at 
reducing this risk have been implemented: new equipment, improved procedures and 
work organization, more training, etc…It is however not possible to conclude that these 
measures allowed to reduce the event frequency: events were still reported to the IRS in 
the 2000s while the oldest one dates back to the 1980s. According to [ 10], the loss of 
RHRS at mid-loop operation has occurred more than 50 times in a period of 25 years. It 
indicates that mid-loop operation should remain in the focus starting from outage 
planning to the phases of preparation and implementation. 
As for equipment-related causes, the three systems concerned are subject to specific 
issues: 
• Pressure locking and thermal binding mainly for RHRS and CCWS because these 
two systems may experience different operating temperature conditions; both in 
normal and accident conditions.  
• Overpressure of RHRS. Although this type of event may also be caused by human 
or organizational factors which can affect many other systems, overpressure is a 
concern specifically for RHRS as this system is connected to RCS. The operating 
pressure of RCS may exceed the RWRS relief valves pressure set-point creating 
the risk that these valves do not reseat as expected. 
• The CCWS is a closed cooling system, providing coolant to many different users 
and in many different conditions. The multiplicity of users and operational 
conditions (normal operations, different accident scenarios) makes it difficult to 
evaluate the different heating loads and the limiting temperature conditions which 
may exceed the design value of CCWS or CCWS-cooled components. 
• CCWS and ESWS may include non-safety related sections, which makes it 
possible that safety-related sections are jeopardized by failure or potential failure 
of non-safety related parts. 
• ESWS is by nature subject to harsh and corrosive environment. This environment 
together with a very difficult access to some sections of ESWS may allow for 
corrosion-induced defects on both, inner and outer surfaces. Consequently it 
initiates, allows propagating, and if it remains undetected, eventually leads to 
catastrophic ruptures as seen in this report. 
The described issues and their potential consequences may be safety relevant and 
require adequate measures to ensure the continuity of the cooling function and help to 
maintain the containment barrier function. Lessons learned from the many events 
reviewed were used as a feedback to develop specific recommendations to minimize or 
avoid any safety impact of similar events in the future operation of related NPPs. The 
recommendations proposed cover all three cooling systems reviewed in this report. 
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Annex: Lessons learned 
 
Typology Lessons learned 
Vibration or 
thermal fatigue 
leading to 
RHRS piping 
leaks/breaks 
• The positioning and condition of the pipe supports have a strong 
effect on the pipe vibration phenomenon. The residual heat 
removal system is particularly sensitive to vibration during the 
evacuation phase and during the transition to mid-loop 
operation (the minimum primary coolant level with the core 
loaded). It is important to remove any nozzles that are 
effectively unnecessary and are sensitive to vibrations in safety-
related systems. 
• The analysis found that the natural frequency of valves may 
come very close to the frequency of the flow induced vibration 
by the RHR pump because the relevant valve was replaced by 
one with a larger diameter during a previous periodic 
inspection. After replacement, it was estimated that the 
relevant drain valve became resonant whenever the RHR pump 
was in operation and this caused fatigue crack at the joint 
portion of the valve and the RHR pump outlet piping. This could 
result in a through-wall crack too. Each valve should only be 
replaced with those designed.  
• Prolonged use (above normal) of the RHR system with a high 
flow in the cold leg aggravates thermal fatigue stress in the 
mixing areas. The plasma technique used to weld the shells of 
RHR system elbows may be also an aggravating factor which 
could explain the existence of long cracks, source of leaks in the 
RHR system. The main mixing area and the mixing area of the 
mini-flow line should be designed to improve resistance against 
thermal fatigue. 
Loss of RHR 
cooling 
function due to 
configuration 
errors 
• Execution of two test procedures in parallel should be avoided, 
especially when dealing with valves (even different) on the 
same circuit. Lack of accurate preparedness, planning and 
communication could lead to staff injury when losing inventory. 
A typical example is to open a vent valve for performing a test 
and then, without receiving confirmation that the vent valve is 
closed, to open the isolation valve – thus aligning the circuit to 
the inlet of the still open vent valve, causing a hot water risk for 
workers and a cooling water loss. 
• More attention should be paid to valve manoeuvres especially 
when the reactor is in an operating mode that poses a 
significant restriction to natural circulation, e.g. open vessel 
with the upper internals still in the vessel and steam generators 
having nozzle-dams installed.  
• Perfect coordination should be maintained at all times, via 
redundant channels and using a 3-way communication between 
the control room and auxiliary building personnel. Valve testing 
and manipulation, in particular, must be carefully coordinated 
so that system status is maintained for accomplishing safety-
related functions and preventing inadvertent spills. 
• Whenever the need is recognized, piping design should be 
improved. Inappropriate isolation valves positioning while RHR 
is on cooling could result in a fast loss-of-coolant event and 
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consequently a common-mode loss of ECCS capability.  
• Work orders should be controlled and compared against each 
other also from the time-line point of view. The analysis showed 
the need to reinforce the work control process. 
Vortex 
formation at 
the RHRS 
pumps suction 
• A significant risk is involved in draining RCS and decreasing the 
RCS level, – at mid loop operation before unloading the core. 
Studies to prevent loss of water inventory have been made and 
resulted in the following improvements: 
• Implementation of a system to detect vortex formation at the 
RHRS pump suctions, based on monitoring operating 
parameters of these pumps (flow rate, pressure and motor 
current); 
• Implementation of an automatic borated water makeup system 
in the RCS, making it possible to guarantee that the water 
inventory will be maintained in the extreme situation of loss of 
the RHRS due to vortex formation.; 
• Improvement of RCS water level monitoring (clear calibration 
procedures, inter-comparison of sensors, etc…) 
• More attention should be paid to level gauges and sensors 
configuration. Vacuum or gas presence in the instrument legs 
can cause a false level indication, potentially leading to a water 
level drop and subsequently to a loss of the RHRS pumps due to 
vortex formation causing cavitation. 
• Increasing or decreasing flow rates should be preceded by 
computer simulations and should be at all times correlated with 
the water level. The effect of flow rate increase or decrease 
should be examined under conditions representative for the 
plant and for each process (e.g. degasing).  
• Drain-down is a sensitive, infrequently performed, operation. 
Such operation, if manually controlled, should be based on a 
direct indication of the critical parameter (water level) available 
to the control room command and should benefit from an 
automatic alarm on decreasing level (due to high nitrogen 
pressure, for example). Loss of control of the primary water 
level during draining to mid-loop has the potential of leading to 
loss of shutdown cooling.  
RHRS 
operating in 
Safety 
Injection mode 
• Events pointed out that the adequacy of the net positive suction 
head (NPSH) available for emergency core cooling (including 
core spray and decay heat removal) and containment heat 
removal pumps may not be adequate under all design-basis 
accident scenarios. In some cases this inadequacy was the 
result of changes in plant configuration, operating procedures, 
environmental conditions, or other operating parameters over 
the lifetime of the plant. 
• The temperature of the fluid at the RHRS pump suction is a 
factor that could also render the pumps inoperable. If a design 
modification cannot be performed, then at least the operation 
procedures should be revised to ensure that when RHRS is 
aligned to ECCS injection mode, the temperature of the RHR 
suction lines from the RCS isolation valve are within prescribed 
limits. 
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• Periodic Engineering Reviews are extremely useful to recognize 
un-analysed conditions or to revisit scenarios previously 
analysed using designer assumptions and hypotheses.  The 
setpoint calculations proved to be a design issue when used to 
prevent air ingress into the safety-related water-systems, 
potentially resulting in damage to pumps and a degradation or 
loss of the safety function. A level setpoint calculation should:  
• Use appropriate methodology to predict the conditions when 
vortexes appear in tanks;  
• Use conservative assumptions to allow for the time required to 
complete switching of pump suctions (operator response times 
and valve stroke times);  
• When needed translate analysis results into operating 
procedures as soon as possible;  
• Account for instrument uncertainties in order to assure an 
adequate “vortexing” margin for the RHRS pumps during 
reactor coolant system mid-loop operation; 
• Account for the potential effect of gas ingress on the level of 
instrument sensing lines. 
Interconnection 
of both 
redundant 
trains of CCWS 
• Usually the plants use purely administrative measures 
extensively to prevent wrong manoeuvrings; these measures 
should be doubled by physical interlocks on isolation valves on 
redundant trains to avoid interconnections which, in the event 
of a leak in one train, may lead to the loss of the entire system. 
• Visual alarms close to the equipment (a panel light, for 
example) should be in place to display a warning when an 
interconnection between two redundant trains is established. In 
addition to this the operating teams should be provided with 
alarm processing instructions. 
Loss of cooling 
of Reactor 
Cooling Pumps 
(RCP) thermal 
barriers 
 
• Some events reported the disruption of RCP seal cooling water 
due to clogging of filters installed upstream the seal cooling 
water pumps. More attention should be paid to the periodic 
maintenance of these filters. 
• An analysis was carried out on this type of events which 
occurred at different occasions and lessons learned are as 
follows: 
• It should be analysed and identified whether sufficient alarms, 
protection systems and interlocks in place; 
• Where applicable intermediate circuit systems should be 
equipped with intermediate circuit pump recirculation lines and 
the operating algorithm for the intermediate circuit system 
should be altered consequently; 
• It should be thoroughly analysed for how long RCPs can operate 
with no intermediate circuit water supply; safe operating 
conditions in the technical specifications should be amended 
wherever necessary; 
• Taking into account ergonomic factors only one activation 
algorithm for operation of the light mimic panels and sound 
alarms in the unit control room should be applied. 
• Periodic engineering reviews should identify whether the 
conditions described in the abnormal operating procedures 
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include steps to ensure that at least one CCWS pump is 
operating while the other operating pump is affected by a 
hazard (fire, for example). The applicable design basis 
documentation needs to incorporate all actions to isolate the 
water return line in the area affected by the hazard, while 
respecting the compliance strategies and the manual action 
timeline analyses. 
Operation of 
CCWS in 
accident 
conditions 
• When establishing the maximum post-accident CCW system 
temperature, (i.e. combination of maximum heat transfer from 
systems cooled by CCWS and minimum CCWS heat rejection 
capability) appropriate methodology should be utilised. The 
methodology should take into account local conditions around 
the coolers, together with the impact of the harsh 
environmental conditions in other places of the plant on the 
quality of the cooling fluid used to remove heat elsewhere. In 
addition, when designing the post-accident conditions for 
monitoring plant parameters, the equipment’s procurement 
specifications should be based on the post-accident conditions 
and not on the normal CCWSS temperatures. 
• Similarly, in case of steam line break inside the containment 
and subsequent isolation of CCWS, the temperature of water 
contained in the CCWS isolated sections (in this case sections 
cooling RHRS and RCS excess let-down) would increase 
temperature to beyond design, leading to potential line 
damages during or after isolation phase when the "hot plug" of 
water is released. Moreover, the margin to vaporisation would 
be reduced. The safety analysis should also consider the 
possibility of restarting the CCWS lines that had been previously 
isolated. 
• Regarding pipe reinforcement for preserving its integrity under 
accident conditions:  
• The need to reinforce the existing support structures of CCW 
sections supplying RHR components which could potentially be 
affected by the passage of the hot plug should be verified. 
Operability of CCW/RHR sections under all accident conditions 
including restart has to be ensured. Reinforcements should be 
designed to withstand seismic loads. 
• Safety margins should be increased with respect to the risk of 
vaporisation through modification of accident operating 
procedures during restart with a view to ensure the proper 
behaviour of the CCWS pumps. Special precautions will be 
necessary to restart the CCWS section supplying the RHR 
components after containment isolation, i.e. containment 
isolation valves must be opened corresponding to the fluid flow 
direction. This will ensure that the hot plug is subjected to the 
discharge pressure of the CCWS pumps, thereby ensuring the 
elimination of potential steam pockets formed during isolation; 
• Although it is considered very useful, serious efforts should be 
made to limit the use of the excess let-down line in the accident 
operating procedures. 
Pressure 
locking and 
• The thermal expansion of water in CCWS piping could produce 
undesirable consequences. When water trapped inside an 
  
 
27
Typology Lessons learned 
thermal 
binding 
isolated portion of the circuit is exposed to increased ambient 
temperature, the inside pressure will build-up, thus potentially 
preventing normal operation of valves and requiring operation 
of drain valves. This kind of phenomenon could also jeopardize 
the structural integrity of the containment penetrations.  
• Pressure relief valves should be installed on each of the 
containment air cooler branch lines. The postulated accident 
scenario (e.g. a loss-of-coolant accident), should take into 
account that depending on the scenario, the containment 
isolation logic could initiate closure of the outlet valve, thereby 
causing water flow to cease. Heat from the containment 
environment would cause the water in the fan coolers between 
the inlet check valve and closed outlet valve to expand, 
potentially causing a rupture in the system. The rupture would 
depressurize the isolated portion of the system and re-establish 
water flow from the operating safety-related portion located 
outside containment through the inlet check valve. The water 
would spill from the rupture and deplete the surge tank, 
thereby causing failure by overheating of safety-related 
equipment served by the remainder of the system.  
ESWS piping 
outer corrosion 
• Operational experience of BONNA pipes had demonstrated 
tendencies of corrosion problems, especially when the 
environment is a marine (salty) one. In order to prevent such 
weakness, modifications of the original design should be made 
appropriately such as introducing an inner anode made of a 
platinum-titanium along the pipe. It may sound trivial, but 
simply painting the external surface of pipes minimizes the 
potential for corrosion. 
• The inspection manholes usually connected to the pipe through 
a vertical neck made of steel proved to be another point prone 
to corrosion due to the harsh environment, as well as 
condensation phenomena and flooding with rainwater inside the 
hatches. Periodic thickness measurements of all manhole necks 
should be performed in order to determine the minimal 
thickness required guaranteeing the structural integrity of necks 
– conservative assumptions should be made when performing 
such calculations. In addition hydraulic tests should be made at 
a frequency to be determined based on local environmental 
conditions. 
• Any surveillance programme should include "blind spots" such 
as the ESWS gallery. The licensees tend to reduce the 
frequency of inspections for the underground locations between 
the main plant buildings and the raw water (sea, river, and 
pond) intake area. Two types of inspections should be carried 
out: routine inspection for piping external parts and in-depth 
inspection for piping internal sides.  
• Related to buried ESWS piping, precautions should be taken to 
assure the adequacy of their supports (e.g. concrete supports), 
especially at points where mechanical tensions may appear (for 
example when passing from sand to normal soil, or when 
exiting the pump house or filter house). These features should 
be addressed starting from the design phase; for adequacy of 
future inspections and repairs, the blueprints should be easy to 
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track to facilitate any work that may need to be performed. If 
the ESWS piping is located near adjacent trenches (for other 
cables or pipes), analyses should be made to determine the 
consequence of an ESWS pipe leak for the adjacent trenches. 
Micro-
biologically 
induced 
corrosion 
• OEF shows that stagnant or intermittent-flow conditions, as in 
the case of emergency diesel service water supply headers, are 
conducive to the growth of microorganisms that can accelerate 
corrosion rates. It shows that crevices such as those in piping 
welds that lack penetration can enhance MIC attack by giving a 
place for deposits and in turn for bacteria to collect.  
• All the licensees should regularly treat the water supply lines 
with biocide or corrosion inhibitors at least when the 
chlorination injection point for the main water headers is 
located, per design, downstream of the branch lines to plant 
equipment (e.g. the emergency diesel generators). The 
program of hypochlorite injection should be designed to 
mitigate MIC problems also within stagnant dead-end sections. 
• The generic evaluation of operating experience feedback 
showed that the degradation mechanism MIC can basically be 
important regarding the impairment of heat removal. At the 
ESWS the chosen materials as well as the constructive and 
operational boundary conditions should be analysed taking into 
account the potential for MIC. The specification of inspections 
should include measures to check if MIC mitigation programme 
is sufficient. 
ESWS piping 
inner coating 
peeling off 
• Foreign materials may be an issue for ESWS heat exchangers, 
for example debris from ESWS piping inner coating material. 
Special attention should be paid during engineered safety 
features/loss of power testing. These tests which are performed 
at higher than normal operating pressure can transport material 
and clog the heat exchangers. Whenever possible, 
supplementary inspection of heat exchangers should be 
performed immediately after such tests. 
• Inner coating can be applied both in the field and in the shop. 
The procedures in place, especially those regulating such 
activity performed in the field, should be adequate to ensure 
proper bonding between coating and the piping body, as well 
between separate layers of coating. 
• To avoid material compatibility problems, lining layers should 
be made of similar materials. For both lining and coating 
adhesion tests should be made to test the material adhesive 
properties. Since ESWS piping transports raw water, it would be 
desirable to perform chemical tests for determining the 
corrosion resistance of the coating, lining and of the adhesive 
materials. 
• The inspection tools and methods should fit to their purposes. 
Improper liner application (e.g. un-noticed caption of small  air 
bubbles between liner and pipe body), together with the use of 
a tool for removing biological live developed inside piping, could 
crack the liner. 
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Degradation of 
ESWS heat 
exchangers 
• A significant event raised attention about the simultaneous 
failures of two ESWS/CCWS heat exchangers and one heat 
exchanger between CCWS and the RCS Nuclear Sampling 
System (NSS), which caused the breach of two barriers and 
established a path for radioactive fluid to the environment. 
Particular lessons learned were raised: 
o Repeated thermal stress at start-up can develop pinholes 
inside a NSS heat exchanger (temperature of the hot 
fluid side higher than 300°C compared to 35°C on the 
cold side). Modifications in the primary coolant sampling 
operating procedures or practices may involve an 
increase in thermal conditioning cycles of the NSS heat 
exchanger. This can induce mechanical aging, corrosion 
and leaks in related system equipment. The need for a 
risk analysis prior to any changes in operating practices 
is stressed; 
o Adequate preventive maintenance should be performed 
even when there are strong materials such as titanium. 
Marine sand erosion of the titanium plates separating the 
CCWS water from the ESWS can cause internal leaks 
from exchangers to the service water circuit. 
o The recurring nature of internal leakage in exchangers 
originates from the fact that only perforated plates were 
replaced systematically and periodically. The decision to 
replace the entire set of plates would have been allowed 
to replace plates already subject to erosion with only 
reduced thickness. There should have been permissible 
leak criteria in place applicable to leakage from the 
CCWS to the ESWS.  
o The radioactive monitoring of effluents should be 
improved and utilised to detect leaks. The detection and 
alarm thresholds of CCWS activity measuring channels 
should prevent gradual pollution of the system. Likewise, 
radiochemical pollution protection, particularly from 
tritium, should be also enhanced. 
• The chemical treatment of the CCWS/ESWS heat exchanger 
tubes (on ESWS side) to deposit a protective layer of ferrous 
sulphate on inner tube surfaces should be performed carefully 
and inspected each time after treatment. Particular lessons 
learned follow: 
o The pressure used to remove carbonate calcium from 
tubes should be high enough to clean the tubes but also 
low enough to prevent protective layer peel-off; 
o After inspection and high pressure cleaning of the heat 
exchanger tubes during maintenance, ferrous sulphate 
should be injected without delay after starting the sea 
water flow operation; 
o Ferrous sulphate solution should be injected in such a 
concentration to minimize the period needed for the 
initial protective film to be formed. 
• Sea water operation of the heat exchangers should be started 
only after the ferrous sulphate injection system is confirmed to 
be operational. This requirement shall be incorporated into the 
operational procedure. In addition, in order to prevent clogging 
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in the ferrous sulphate injection piping, the piping should be 
thoroughly cleaned after injection. This shall also be reflected in 
the operational procedure. 
Other 
typologies 
Unavailability of RHRS due to lubrication issues 
• Wrong practises consisting in mixing different lubricants have 
been revealed concerning the RHR pumps. This is particularly 
significant for those pumps which are located inside the reactor 
building and are consequently exposed to radiation. The weak 
point of mixed lubricants is their behaviour in a radiative 
environment which may lead to a common mode failure. In one 
of the events both pumps were lubricated with the same 
mixture. Adequate experience feedback is raised with regard to 
lubrication practices to avoid a common mode failure that would 
not be limited to the residual heat removal pumps: 
o Use of different types of grease, depending on whether 
the components to be lubricated are located inside or 
outside the reactor building; 
o As concerns the RHRS pumps which operate 
intermittently and are located inside the reactor building 
(problems associated with frequency of lubrication and 
premature ageing of the grease caused by irradiation), it 
is requested to make-up new grease at the beginning of 
refuelling outages and remove old grease. Such make-
up is recommended at the beginning and end of each 
ten-yearly outage; 
o Limit the number of types of grease intended for 
lubrication of safety-related rotating machines to, if 
possible, two types of grease per plant; 
o Choose types of grease that are reputedly miscible with 
each other; 
o Use the same type of grease for lubricating both motor 
and pump; 
o Arrange the frequency of lubrication to be the same for 
both motor and pump. 
Inadequate calibration of RHRS flow rate meters  
• Problems were reported concerning inaccurate readings of a 
RHRS flow element because the instruments were calibrated for 
high temperature water flow and readings were not corrected 
for operation at other temperatures.  
• Such kind of events are happening, usually, due to personnel 
error, cognitive, in that the flow element design information 
was not incorporated when establishing the Surveillance Test 
Procedure flow settings. The temperature used in the 
instrument scaling calculation should be evaluated and the 
Surveillance Test Procedures and Operating Procedures should 
be revised to include a temperature correction. 
Temporary device rendering with one CCWS train unavailable 
• The possibility to perform a quality control at the end of 
manufacturing process of these devices in collaboration 
between end user and manufacturer should be investigated. 
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Organisational dysfunctions in their use and management, 
together with improper application of procedures in compliance 
with existing general operating rules, have the potential to 
cause the operator to declare the equipment unavailable.  
• Whenever possible and if the in-house capabilities can support 
it, new temporary testing and/or signalling devices should be 
manufactured (by an automation or electrical shop) to assure a 
more rigorous quality control procedure and to guarantee 
correct operation before actual use. 
• The manoeuvring sheets for actions that must be conducted by 
the operator should be clarified and be concise, in order to 
simplify the procedure of installing and removing temporary 
testing and/or signalling devices.  
Failure of the 10kV circuit breaker of a CCWS pump 
• Micro cracks caused by the manufacturing process can induce 
degradation. This degradation can occur after a long term, too. 
Circuit breakers with similar design (carrier compressed out of 
the expansion shaft by cold forming) should be inspected (for 
example by dye penetrant testing) if they have comparable 
deficiencies. In this case it should be investigated, if the 
extensions shafts have to be changed prematurely. 
• When dealing with a spurious failure of a certain type of 
electrical equipment (in this case a circuit breaker), the 
investigation should be extended to all similar equipment in the 
plant to avoid the risk of a common cause failure. If this extent 
of condition assessment is not done by the licensee, the 
regulator should request it after a second failure. 
ESWS pump not starting during periodic test 
• When performing periodic test on equipment and requiring 
service water, it is important to have the correct mode selected 
(manual/automatic) to assure that the required ESWS pump will 
start as expected.  
• When performing in-service inspections or periodic 
maintenance, all items should be checked and verified. Even 
non safety relevant components as small lamps, diodes and 
other indicators can lead to undetected unavailability of safety 
relevant components. The function of such non safety relevant 
components should be tested during periodic tests and in 
service inspections too. 
Loss of seismic qualification for several valves due to inadequate 
maintenance 
• A simple inversion of two sets of screws could cause ESWS 
valves to lose their seismic qualification. Efforts should be made 
to provide these valves with individually marked screws. 
• OEF underlines the importance of maintenance quality and of 
monitoring the respective operations. Qualification intended to 
demonstrate equipment ability to perform in the event of an 
earthquake shall be done prior to installation of equipment at 
the site. Long term qualification cannot be verified with regular 
tests of equipment. 
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Typology Lessons learned 
• The need for regular efforts is highlighted to increase awareness 
in maintenance teams of certain standard practices (proper 
screw identification, tightening torque, choice of tools, etc.) that 
affect seismic qualification in long term. 
Inadequate valve closure setup renders one ESWS train inoperable 
• Preventive maintenance proved to be useful to detect, through 
tests, valve seat leakage. When looking at the isolation valves 
between the Service Water system (i.e. non-safety related part 
of the system) and one train of the Essential Service Water 
System (i.e. safety related part of the system), a specific Post 
Maintenance Testing matrix, to consolidate testing requirements 
for such valves, should be developed and applied.  
• During the process of establishing the ESW leak monitoring 
program and closing the related documents to reduce the 
corrective action program backlog, special attention should be 
given to avoid inappropriate closure of the monitoring program 
following receipt of calculations which may alleviate the 
concerns addressed by the program. 
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How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu 
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